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ABSTRACT
Dengue’s re-emerging epidemiology poses a major global health threat.
India contributes significantly to the global communicable disease
burden has been declared highly dengue-endemic, exposing public
health authorities to severe challenges. Our study aims to provide a
deeper understanding of India’s urban dengue surveillance policies as
well as to explore the organisation, functioning and integration of
existing disease control pillars. We conducted a qualitative regional case
study, consisting of semi-structured expert interviews and observational
data, covering the urban region of Hyderabad in South India. Our findings
indicate that Hyderabad’s dengue surveillance system predominantly
relies on public reporting units, neglecting India’s large private health
sector. The surveillance system requires further strengthening and
additional efforts to efficiently integrate existing governmental initiatives
at all geographical levels and administrative boundaries. We concluded
with recommendations for improved consistency, accuracy, efficiency and
reduction of system fragmentation to enhance the integration of dengue
surveillance and improved health information in urban India. Finally, our
study underlines India’s overall need to increase investment in public
health and health infrastructures. That requires coordinated and multi-
level action targeting the development of a competent, effective and
motivated public health cadre, as well as truly integrated surveillance and
epidemic response infrastructure, for dengue and beyond.
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Background
Dengue in a global context
Dengue is a rapidly expanding vector-borne disease with more than half of the global population
living in dengue-endemic areas (Messina et al., 2019). In the last decades, dengue’s incidence has
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seen a 30-fold increase, with a current estimation of 390 million annual infections. In the last year
alone, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control reported a substantial increase in
dengue incidence, with particularly high numbers in the Americas and the Caribbean (Angelo
et al., 2020; ECDC, 2019; WHO, 2012).
Dengue is a mosquito-borne viral infection with a spectrum that ranges from subclinical (people
are not even aware that they are infected) to severe flu-like manifestations. The WHO classifies an
infection into ‘dengue’ and ‘severe dengue’. The latter is less common and is often associated with
severe bleeding, organ impairment and/or plasma leakage. The dengue virus (DENV) has four
types (DENV1, DENV2, DENV3 and DENV4), meaning that the same person can be infected
four times before full immunity can be established (WHO, 2019a).
Dengue transmission is following distinct seasonal (within a year) and cyclical (outbreaks in cer-
tain years) patterns, reflecting multiple interactions with climatic conditions (temperature and rain-
fall), vectors, the circulating virus, and a population’s immunity status (Castro et al., 2017). Dengue’s
transmission occurs through the highly urban adapted Aedes mosquito and is facilitated by rapidly
expanding urban environments. The risk is primarily increased by poor housing, the absence of
piped water supply and insufficient waste management, providing ideal mosquito breeding con-
ditions (Arunachalam et al., 2010; Modi & Vaishnav, 2018). According to the International Health
Regulations, dengue becomes a notifiable disease of international concern if the event is serious and
unexpected, including a significant risk of international spread or requiring travel and trade restric-
tions for containment (WHO, 2008). Signatory states are obliged to provide detection of elevated
disease and death rates, facilitate the instant implementation of control measures, and ensure a
timely reporting to theWorld Health Organisation (WHO) (WHO, 2005). The regional and national
implementation of the International Health Regulations face serious challenges on various admin-
istrative levels.
New and evidence-based strategies are needed to reverse dengue’s emerging trend (WHO, 2018).
Key to its containment is the quantification of disease burden which enables policy makers to set
priorities, allocate funding, decide on prevention and control strategies and evaluate the cost-effec-
tiveness of interventions. The real challenge is that only very few dengue-endemic countries have
functioning health information and surveillance systems in place (Castro et al., 2017). This leads
to uncertainties in current estimates and thus in comparisons of the dengue burden between regions
and countries. India, being the focus of this study, is a highly dengue-endemic country with high
fluctuations of reported cases across government sectors (Das et al., 2014).
Dengue surveillance in India
India reflects 34% of dengue’s global burden (Chakravarti et al., 2012). According to India’s National
Vector Borne Disease Control Programme (NVBDCP), the number of reported cases and deaths
escalated from about 28,000 cases and 110 deaths in 2010 to 129,000 cases and 245 deaths in
2016 (NVBDCP, 2017). These figures merely consist of data from government hospitals, entirely
neglecting India’s large private health sector, which covers approximately 80% of all dengue-related
healthcare visits (Modi & Vaishnav, 2018; Mohuya Chaudhuri, 2013; Shepard et al., 2014). Regional
comparisons suggest vast underreporting of dengue cases across India (Halasa et al., 2011; Shepard
et al., 2014). Considering its re-emergence, rapid spread and the increasing need for richer infor-
mation, such as spatially segregated data that allow the identification of exact outbreak occurrence
and spread, dengue is a disease that requires enhanced public health research and surveillance (Bhatt
et al., 2013; Gupta & Reddy, 2013; Sivagnaname et al., 2012). An enhanced public health surveillance
system, based on accurate and timely data, is essential to the prediction and detection of dengue out-
breaks and ultimately to overall disease containment (Daude & Mazumdar, 2016; Murray, 2007;
Pilot et al., 2017).
This study focuses on dengue surveillance in the urban region of Hyderabad, contributing
towards a ‘reality check’ on the implementation status of the International Health Regulations in
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India. Disease surveillance has been and remains a challenging public health task across the subcon-
tinent (Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, 2015). Particularly complex surveillance elements
include the accurate monitoring of disease burden and trends, as well as the detection, confirmation
and control of outbreaks before disproportional spread and damage (Angelo et al., 2008; Pilot et al.,
2017). India’s administrative organisation is divided into several layers, consisting of national, state
and district units, as well as villages and blocks in rural areas or municipal local bodies and wards in
urban regions. One way the Government of India aims to address health challenges is through the
implementation of national health programmes. The country currently maintains two separate and
independently operating national surveillance programmes, both reporting dengue data parallel to
other infectious diseases. These programmes consist of the Integrated Disease Surveillance Pro-
gramme (IDSP) and National Vector Borne Disease Control Programme (NVBDCP) (Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare, 2018; NVBDCP, 2018). On the local urban level, municipal infectious
disease reporting authorities operate as an additional surveillance and vector control layer. Thus,
in the context of dengue, the stakes are divided among IDSP, NVBDCP and municipal authorities.
The effective implementation of such programmes relies on the integration of various stake-
holders, inter-sectoral coordination, evidence-based planning, public-private partnerships, cross-
programme cooperation and strong primary health care and public health leadership (Lenka &
Kar, 2012; Pilot et al., 2017). The WHO highlights the need to implement national health pro-
grammes in ways that are integrative, foster synergies and increase effectiveness, ultimately con-
tributing to the Sustainable Development Goals (Lenka & Kar, 2012). Nonetheless, India’s
surveillance activities are primarily implemented within vertically operating centralised disease
control programmes (e.g. IDSP, NVBDCP). Although centralised health programmes can be
effective, in the case of India they are often limited by several drawbacks and weaknesses;
firstly, their fragmented nature (i.e. lack of coordination and comprehensive public health
approaches among vertical programmes) inevitably constrains their capacities for timely and opti-
mal outbreak detection. Secondly, their strong functional autonomy leads to avoidable dupli-
cations of efforts. Thirdly, their limited integration and flexibility ultimately restrict benefits of
cross-sectoral collaboration and communication (Duran et al., 2014; Phalkey, Shukla, et al.,
2013; Pilot et al., 2019).
Surveillance types
The WHO distinguishes broadly among three types of surveillance: passive, active and sentinel. Pas-
sive surveillance receives data from all potential reporting units. A disease case is only captured if the
patient decides to seek health care. Passive surveillance systems rely on very broad networks, with all
facilities that involve patient contact being required to report cases at regular intervals. Passive sur-
veillance is the most common and least expensive form of surveillance, however, it is often burdened
by weaknesses due to (1) full dependence on the cooperation of an extensive network and (2)
unequal distribution of skills and case detection resources within the network, often leading to
incomplete and/or delayed reporting (WHO, 2019b).
In an active surveillance context, disease cases are captured through the healthcare system’s active
screening activities, such as in-person visits of medical facilities, screening of medical records and
physical examinations. Identified cases are then directly investigated and reported by active
surveillance providers, which is costly but often ensures a timely and targeted approach (WHO,
2019b).
Instead of trying to gather surveillance data from all healthcare facilities, a sentinel surveillance
system is based on selected (randomly or intentionally) reporting units. These units should ideally
capture a significant amount of cases and be equipped with good laboratory facilities and qualified
staff. While very useful to predict trends and outbreaks, sentinel surveillance systems only capture
cases within selected areas and are thus not ideal for detecting rare diseases or diseases outside
the catchment area (WHO, 2019b).
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Dengue surveillance in Hyderabad district
To understand the complexity of dengue surveillance and health information availability in urban
India, this paper draws on a case study of Hyderabad city. Hyderabad is the largest city and capital
of the state of Telangana (see map in supplementary material). The Greater Hyderabad Municipal
Corporation (GHMC) was created in 2007 and has an estimated population of around 10 million,
spanning across 650 square kilometres (Government of Telangana, 2019; World Population Review,
2020). The dengue incidence of Hyderabad city has been continuously rising (from 147 cases in 2017
to1043 cases in 2019) (Mk, 2019; TelanganaToday, 2019). Local officials admit that the reported
numbers could be a gross underestimation of actual incidence, providing a misleading picture of
the actual dengue burden (Mk, 2019).
Hyderabad’s district-level dengue surveillance activities are primarily divided among three
publicly funded organisational pillars. Two pillars of dengue surveillance consist of the pre-
viously mentioned national health programmes, IDSP and NVBDCP, while the third pillar con-
sists of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation’s (GHMC) health wing. The first pillar,
the IDSP, operating under the National Centre for Disease Control and Director General of
Health Services of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, was launched in 2004 and aims
to improve India’s regional and national disease surveillance and response. Its key objectives
consist of enabling the timely surveillance of epidemic-prone diseases, monitoring disease
trends, facilitating the timely response to outbreaks, as well as integrating vertically operating
surveillance efforts. Additionally, the IDSP is responsible for the reporting of presumptive, sus-
pected and confirmed dengue cases (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2018). The second
pillar, NVBDCP, is the government’s central nodal agency for the prevention and control of vec-
tor-borne diseases, as well as one of the technical departments of the Directorate General of
Health Services of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (NVBDCP, 2018). The NVBDCP
is responsible for synthesising reports on suspected and confirmed dengue cases, initiating pre-
vention activities, facilitating health awareness and ensuring immediate outbreak response. The
third pillar, GHMC’s urban health wing, covers Hyderabad and minor parts of three surrounding
districts (GHMC, 2018). GHMC’s urban health wing is state-detached, self-funded and respon-
sible for sanitation, as well as preventive and emergency-driven vector control measures. In
addition, GHMC’s urban malaria scheme (also covering dengue) is responsible for a parallel col-
lection of suspected and confirmed dengue cases, while developing and distributing awareness
material.
All three agencies are operating within the same municipal boundaries and are collecting dengue
information independently, in parallel and at different scales. Figure 1 shows an overview of the three
responsible authorities and their main activities.
This study aims to contribute to an improved understanding of India’s national dengue surveil-
lance policies, their implementation within urban regions and the complex interactions between
responsible municipal and national health authorities. Using the city of Hyderabad as an urban
case study, the study’s leading research questions are:
(1) How is dengue surveillance organised, functioning and integrated in the urban district of
Hyderabad?
(2) How do urban district and state government authorities communicate, coordinate and interlink
dengue information reporting?
Materials and method
Our methodology followed a qualitative policy analysis approach, consisting of expert interviews and
field visit observations. Our conceptual and analytical basis was built upon McNabb’s et al. frame-
work of public health surveillance and action, which offers a structured overview of major
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surveillance and response activities (McNabb et al., 2002). The framework identifies two separate,
though interdependent processes, embedded within an open system of continuous information
and activity flow. The first process is that of ‘public health surveillance’, subdivided into six inter-
linked primary activities. Those are case (1) detection, (2) registration, (3) laboratory confirmation,
(4) reporting, (5) data analysis and (6) feedback. The second process is that of ‘public health action’,
referring to planned or unplanned activities of maintaining, improving and protecting population
health. Further, supportive activities that apply to both processes equally include the presence of
communication channels, availability of staff training, supervision processes and the provision of
adequate resources. Beyond serving as the study’s conceptual basis, we applied the model as a guid-
ing framework for data retrieval, analysis and interpretation (McNabb et al., 2002).
We initially performed 14 semi-structured interviews (supplementary Table S 1) of experts and
stakeholders, operating within Hyderabad’s dengue surveillance system. These were complemented
and confirmed by observational data that were retrieved in parallel during extensive field visits. The
interviews were designed to predominantly capture elements of the organisation, functioning and
integration of dengue surveillance activities across Hyderabad’s municipal area. Questions were
framed on the basis of McNabb’s et al. conceptual framework, addressing core surveillance elements,
consequent public health action and relevant supportive resources. Interviewee selection followed
the principles of purposive, as well as ‘snowball’ sampling, justified on occupational position within
IDSP, NVBSCP or GHMC, or on being a regional surveillance expert. Table S 2 (supplementary
material) provides an overview of the interviewed informants. The underlying study population is
the Hyderabad municipal population.
This study relied on information provided consensually by experts, as well as official and pub-
lished data. An ethical clearance was therefore not required. All interviews took place between Feb-
ruary and June 2016. To update the study reconfirmation about reporting units and function were
obtained in early 2020 through reach out to some of the stakeholders previously interviewed.
Data analysis
Our starting point was an already established conceptual framework, for which our analysis followed
deductive qualitative principles (Saldaña, 2016). We developed three overall codes, each correspond-
ing to the conceptual framework’s thematic clusters of public health surveillance, public health
action and supportive activities. These codes were used on all transcribed interviews to broadly
divide them into three categories. This was followed by a thorough thematic analysis, iteratively
Figure 1. Overview of dengue surveillance stakeholders in Hyderabad, India.
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identifying subthemes (attached to sub-codes), as well as overall linkages and patterns. Interview sec-
tions that did not fit into one of the overall categories were attached to iteratively developed second-
ary categories. The same procedure was applied to all observational data (OD). All interviews were
attached to ID numbers (ID1, ID2…), which were subsequently used as references throughout the
results section.
Results
The following three sections provide an account on the organisation and functioning of Hyderabad’s
three surveillance pillars (IDSP, NVBDCP, GHMC) individually, while the fourth section assesses
the current integration and cooperation activities across these. Each pillar is reported individual
as all three operate predominantly isolated.
Pillar 1: The Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme (IDSP)
The organisation of IDSP
The IDSP’s district surveillance office of Hyderabad consists of four key positions. Head of the office
is the district surveillance officer, who is simultaneously recruited by the NVBDCP. The remaining
positions consist of one epidemiologist, one data operator and one data manager, with the last pos-
ition being vacant at the point of interview. Four additional data operators are outsourced in four
governmental tertiary health institutions, simultaneously operating as dengue sentinel surveillance
units. While the four sentinel surveillance units are responsible for confirming dengue cases,
IDSP’s dengue surveillance is passive. IDSP’s dengue reports are received from a broad network
of health facilities across Hyderabad. The sentinel surveillance units merely act as confirmation
agents. We keep the term ‘sentinel units’ across the manuscript because it is the commonly used
term within IDSP, though not all of them have all required resources a sentinel unit should ideally
have.
The functioning of IDSP
Reporting: Reporting constitutes a major and crucial IDSP component and is embedded in a web of
reporting units across all healthcare levels. Reported cases can be suspected, presumptive or labora-
tory-confirmed. S–forms (suspected cases) are completed by auxiliary nursing midwives, conducting
field and primary healthcare work. P-forms (presumptive cases) fall under the responsibility of medi-
cal officers and L-forms (laboratory-confirmed cases) under the responsibility of laboratory staff.
IDSP receives reports from 107 public (85 Urban Primary Health Centres, 9 Urban Community
Health Centres, 4 Community Dispensaries, 1 District Hospital, 3 Area Hospitals, 1 Institute of Pre-
ventive Medicine, 4 Medical Colleges) and 18 private hospitals. Six reporting units are described as
sentinel. Two major reporting challenges include the completeness and accuracy of data. With only
18 out of 863 recognised municipal private hospitals regularly reporting to IDSP, the system captures
only about 30% of the municipal population. Experts attribute that gap to a lack of information,
missing governmental enforcement and pure irresponsibility (ID 1; ID 2). Beyond that, evidence
suggests low validity of suspected and presumptive data, primarily linked to purposively reduced
numbers, as well as incomplete outpatient registration. Interviewees indicate that many low-level
healthcare staff intentionally reduce the number of reported cases due to fears of negative feedback
from superiors. The higher the number of reported cases, the more likely it is for a superior to
express concerns, dissatisfaction and negative feedback. With lacking instructions on how to validate
suspected and presumptive dengue cases, district-level outbreak analysis is primarily restricted to
confirmed cases (ID 1, ID 2). A fair volume of reporting remains paper-based, which is described
as burdensome and unnecessarily resourceful (OD, ID 8). Reports include the age, gender, address
and name of each patient. While reports are perceived as adequate, they are often not complete
enough to categorise the severity of each case (ID 6, ID 3).
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Confirmation: Accurate, timely and reliable disease confirmation is a crucial component of any dis-
ease surveillance system. In Hyderabad, and within IDSP, dengue confirmation exclusively occurs
through a network of six sentinel laboratory-reporting units, linked to tertiary healthcare services
(ID 1). Primary health centres are excluded from any confirmatory activity, despite being the most
accessible and utilised facilities. The combination of a disproportional population size and a limited
number of laboratories ultimately leaves a significant number of dengue cases unconfirmed, indicat-
ing the need to strengthen primary level confirmatory capacities (ID 1, ID 2). Similarly, there are indi-
cations of a weak compliance to national regulations on dengue confirmation procedures, primarily
by the few private healthcare facilities, which fail to utilise the IDSP-accepted MAC-ELISA tests (ID
2). Thus, the few private reports entering the IDSP surveillance system require time-consuming and
costly cross-checks before entering the IDSP reports. One MAC-ELISA kit can be used for up to 96
samples, incentivising many laboratories to reduce waste by conducting tests in three- to four-day
circles, inevitably causing delays and reducing the system’s effectiveness (ID 7, ID 2).
Analysis: Following reporting, the district epidemiologist, district medical officer and data operator
are responsible for appropriate analysis. Based on most reliable L-data (laboratory-confirmed),
analysis occurs according to geographical and time parameters. A three-year outbreak peak pattern
was identified and presents a successful step towards improved prediction and preparedness. Analy-
sis is described as basic, periodical and primarily intensified during endemic periods. The missing
provision of Geographic Information System (GIS) tools for spatial analysis has been mentioned
as a major analytical weakness of IDSP’s district unit (ID 1).
Action: During dengue outbreaks, the IDSP´s responsibilities remain significantly limited to trigger-
ing the surveillance data-driven response (ID 1). The district surveillance officer of Hyderabad, sim-
ultaneously responsible for the NVBDCP, initially confirms the outbreak, supported by an external
microbiologist (ID 2). While the IDSP’s pro-active and preventive activities remain insufficient,
emergency-driven responses, consisting of mobilising the NVBDCP and the GHMC, are described
as functioning and effective (ID 1).
Supportive Surveillance Functions: Hyderabad’s IDSP lacks dedicated mobility measures, human
resources, IT equipment and financial support (ID 1, ID 14). While sentinel testing and reporting
units receive regular stocks and have sufficient human and material resources, smaller laboratories
face severe infrastructural gaps (ID 6, ID 7, ID 13). With missing equipment and no officially estab-
lished mode of communication, the exchange of information between IDSP staff remains dependent
on personal means and is largely informal. The provision of freeWi-Fi is described as highly beneficial
for speeding up communication during emergencies (ID 1). On the contrary, sentinel surveillance lab-
oratories are well connected, including functioning internet and e-mail services. An IDSP-wide, fully
functioning telecommunication system remains to be established (ID 6, ID 13, ID 14, OD)
On district surveillance level, internal supervision of general, as well as dengue-related surveil-
lance activities are perceived as existing and adequate (ID 1). However, external supervision,
specifically targeting quality maintenance of sentinel dengue surveillance laboratories remains
non-existent. A previously established and highly beneficial external quality assurance scheme
was operated for six months and discontinued (ID 6). A summary of our core findings on the
IDSP’s organisation and functioning in Hyderabad is provided by Box 1.
Box 1. Key Findings on Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme’s Functioning in Hyderabad.
. Key responsibility is passive surveillance
. 107 public and 18 private reporting units report on a weekly basis
. Dengue case confirmation is restricted to six sentinel units
. Weak reporting accuracy, completeness, timeliness and reliability
. Reporting is staff intensive, with a mix of paper and electronic reporting channels
. Low validity of presumptive and suspected dengue cases
. Low coverage of reporting by private healthcare institutions
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. Weak confirmatory capacities
. Basic and periodical epidemiological analysis
. Insufficient manpower, mobility, IT and financial resources
. Primarily informal internal communication
. Adequate internal but lacking external supervision
Pillar 2: The National Vector Borne Disease Control Programme (NVBDCP)
The organisation of NVBDCP
Under the NVBDCP, the district is divided into six subunits, each headed by one subunit officer.
Units are further subdivided into 33 sectors, headed by multi-purpose health supervisors, and 75 sec-
tions, filled with active and passive multi-purpose health assistants. NVBDCP is primarily perform-
ing vector and disease surveillance. NVBDCP’s dengue reporting is entirely based on confirmed
cases, retrieved from four sentinel laboratories. NVBDCP was built upon the former the malaria
programme and some descriptions are still malaria-related (e.g. malaria workers, malaria units).
Active agents are responsible for field work surveillance, while passive agents are positioned in
malaria units within larger governmental health facilities, taking dengue samples after patient refer-
ral. These field level agents, also known as ‘malaria workers’, are entirely excluded from any involve-
ment in dengue testing and confirmatory activities (ID 5, ID 10). With no ground-level availability of
dengue tests, suspected cases of dengue or other vector-borne diseases are referred to higher levels
with adequate laboratory facilities (ID 4).
The functioning of NVBDCP
Reporting:NVBDCP reports flow electronically on a daily and weekly routine, initiated at the units and
then sent to district and state authorities on a monthly basis (ID 10, ID 13, ID 14). NVBDCP’s vertical
and non-integrated operation restricts reporting to a selected network of sentinel laboratories. Primary
and secondary facilities are entirely excluded from dengue reporting (ID 5). Similar to IDSP, low levels
of private hospital participation constitute a major challenge for the system’s accuracy.
Action: Beyond reporting, the NVBDCP holds primary responsibility for the implementation of den-
gue outbreak responses. The programme’s activities primarily consist of symptom-based fever sur-
veillance and vector sample collection, conducted in and around a patient’s house. In addition, the
NVBDCP is responsible for primary prevention activities and health awareness. A repeatedly
emphasised example is the ‘Friday Dry-Day’ campaign, incentivising community measures for the
weekly removal of unnecessary vector breeding sites (ID 10, ID 12). Key dengue-related weaknesses
are induced by missing efforts to upgrade, improve and expand the skills of field workers. Traditional
techniques and outdated technical equipment require replacement by novel approaches and modern
technology, ultimately targeting health awareness and prevention. Human resources are scarce,
especially on health worker level, with more than 50% of sanctioned positions remaining vacant.
Nonetheless, the good sentinel surveillance network has been mentioned as the system’s main
strength (ID 4, ID 10). A summary of our core findings on NVBDCP’s organisation and functioning
in Hyderabad is provided by Box 2.
Box 2. Key Findings on National Vector Borne Disease Control Programme’s Functioning in Hyderabad.
. Key district actor for dengue outbreak response and mitigation
. Dengue confirmation based on four sentinel units
. No coverage of reporting by private healthcare institutions
. Fully electronic reporting, via e-mail
. Responses primarily consist of fever-based surveillance, vector control and sample collection
. Additionally respnsible for primary prevention and health awareness
. Vertical and malaria-focused field surveillance activities
. Lacking human resources and modern surveillance equipment
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Pillar 3: The Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC)
The organisation of GHMC
The GHMC area is administratively divided into five zones (north, east, south, west, central), 24 cir-
cles and 150 wards. The health wing’s head office is supervised by the municipality’s chief medical
officer who is responsible for sanitation activities, as well as a chief entomologist who is responsible
for vector control throughout the municipal area. Each zone is headed by a senior entomologist, and
each circle by an assistant medical officer and an assistant entomologist. GHMC’s surveillance
approach is primarily passive sentinel.
The functioning of GHMC
Reporting: The vector control department of the GHMC’s health wing is the key municipal actor in
Hyderabad´s dengue surveillance initiatives. It maintains a separate reporting system for suspected
and confirmed dengue cases, including 52 private and 8 governmental reporting units. Approxi-
mately 80% of integrated private facilities are large corporate (municipal) hospitals, ranging between
100 and 1500 beds. In 2014, the GHMC developed an online portal, dedicated to private reporting of
malaria and dengue; the portal failed soon after due to technical difficulties. Currently, reporting
occurs exclusively via e-mail. Governmental reports not reaching the GHMC’s health wing are
retrieved by the NVBDCP´s district malaria offices. Reporting is perceived as being not fully consist-
ent, while most of smaller corporate hospitals remain non-integrated (ID 11).
Action: Routine GHMC activities are divided into, reporting, prevention, outbreak response and
awareness. Preventive measures refer to anti-larval activities, occurring domestically during inter-
endemic and outbreak-prone periods (ID 11, ID 12). Although efforts are evident, preventive
measures fail to cover all areas, such as wards of higher socio-economic status as they often refuse
anti-larval operations. Awareness-raising activities target the general public through the distribution
of simple information material and school programmes (ID 11). Responsive action is taken in the
case of suspected or confirmed reports. Operations target larvae, as well as adult mosquitos through
the use of pyrethrum sprays and fogging. Opinions on the GHMC’s preventive measures vary and
are internally perceived as a major strength, while externally evaluated as non-existent and
inadequate (ID 3, ID 11). A core inadequacy of the current surveillance system is the complete
absence of active surveillance data across the municipal area. A potential surveillance asset is the
GHMC’s dedicated GIS department, regularly used by health wing entomologists for mapping of
dengue and malaria cases. The integration of large corporate hospitals and the creation of a circle
level committee for monthly reviews of municipal vector control activities are additional surveillance
strengths (ID 11, ID 14). A summary of core findings on GHMC’s organisation and functioning in
Hyderabad is provided by Box 3.
Box 3. Key Findings on Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation’s Functioning in Hyderabad
. Key municipal actor for reporting, prevention, response and awareness
. Maintains an independent (separate from NVBDCP and IDSP) reporting infrastructure
. Reporting units include 52 public and 8 private facilities
. Electronic reporting, via e-mail
. Preventive, anti-larval activities fail to cover all areas in need
. Awareness targets the general public
. Missing active surveillance activities
. Regular use of GIS mapping for surveillance needs
Connecting the Pillars: Integration of Surveillance Activities
The integration of dengue surveillance activities in urban Hyderabad has been assessed within, as
well as across the IDSP, NVBDCP and GHMC, while additionally considering various administrative
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levels. Efforts to establish integrated reporting structures and facilitate the inclusion of private facili-
ties have been subject to particular focus. Figure 2 provides an overview of the administrative inte-
gration and reporting structure of IDSP, NVBDCP and GHMC.
Administrative integration
In terms of administrative organisation, district-level integration or at least coordination is evident
only between the IDSP and NVBDCP, as both national programmes share one district surveillance
officer (ID 1). At district level, integration is limited to administrative processes and information
exchange, while concrete outbreak-related activities remain a NVBDCP responsibility (ID 10).
Nonetheless, the administrative merger is perceived as significantly facilitating cooperation and
report uniformity (ID1, ID 2). The GHMC is administratively fully detached from the other two pil-
lars Nonetheless, respondents referred to an outbreak-driven cooperation between the GHMC and
NVBDCP, with the first being responsible for mosquito control and the second for vector surveil-
lance measures (ID11, ID12). In strong contrast, there seems to be no cooperation between the
IDSP and GHMC (ID 2, ID 11).
Reporting integration
The integration of dengue reports between the IDSP and NVBDCP is limited to laboratory-
confirmed data (L-forms). Suspected and presumptive cases (S-forms and P-forms) are considered
as relatively unreliable therefore not shared with NVBDCP, neither used for outbreak analysis (ID 1,
ID 14). Reporting procedures remain non-integrated, with IDSP reports captured in standardised
forms, electronically and on paper, while NVBDCP reports flow via format less e-mails (ID 6).
Data are merged after reaching the common district surveillance office. Despite that, comparative
analyses of reports indicate small discrepancies in confirmed dengue cases, attributable to differences
in inclusion criteria. The NVBDCP excludes all patients that are not resident in the district of Hyder-
abad, leading to a difference of 7 cases in 2014 and 21 cases in 2015 (ID 1). Finally, the municipal
health wing maintains a separate dengue reporting system, operating via e-mail on a weekly basis,
which is in fact linked with the NVBDCP’s reporting through regular data exchange, aiming for a
unification of GHMC and NVBDCP reports. A direct integration between the GHMC and IDSP
dengue reports does not exist, however, could potentially occur indirectly via the NVBDCP (ID
11). Efforts for an overall, comprehensive integration of dengue reporting are not evident.
Figure 2. Dengue surveillance system map of Hyderabad, India.
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Integration of private actors
Experts suggest that approximately 80% of Hyderabad’s citizens seek private healthcare, highlighting
the paramount significance of integrating private actors within state and municipal surveillance
approaches (ID 1, ID 13, ID 14). The integration of private reporting units into the IDSP and
NVBDCP has been a repeatedly mentioned and largely neglected limitation. In fact, only 2% (18
out of 863) of private hospitals in Hyderabad report dengue cases to IDSP, which is rather irregular
and informal (ID 1). The non-integration of private facilities is attributed to lacking responsibility,
communication and legal enforcement (ID 2). One respondent estimated that the programme cur-
rently captures less than half of all actually occurring dengue infections, leaving a large proportion
unaccounted for (ID 1). The municipal health wing shows a slightly better integration of private
healthcare providers, with approximately 8% of registered private facilities reporting dengue cases.
A summary of core findings on Hyderabad dengue surveillance integration is provided by Box 4.
Box 4. Key Findings on Hyderabad’s Dengue Surveillance Integration
. Administrative integration only between state programmes of the IDSP and NVBDCP, leaving municipal dengue
surveillance activities detached
. Integration of reports between the IDSP and NVBDCP limited to laboratory data
. Actual reporting procedures remain non-integrated
. Report-inclusion criteria vary between the IDSP, NVBDCP and GHMC
. Information exchange only occurs between the NVBDCP and GHMC
. Only 2% of all recognised private healthcare facilities report to IDSP/NVBDCP
. Lacking integration of private facilities potentially leaves more than 50% of dengue burden unidentified by the IDSP/
NVBDCP
. Cross-checking of private samples by the state lab potentially captures a portion of private data into the IDSP’s/NVBDCP’s
surveillance system
. 8% of recognised private health care facilities report to GHMC’s surveillance system
. Reporting efforts overlap and an integrated approach is missing
Discussion
Hyderabad’s dengue surveillance activities are divided across three distinct, as well as independently
functioning pillars. That division ultimately evolves in a complex administrative, procedural and
infrastructural web. The two national surveillance programmes and the regionally bound municipal
health wing operate on various levels, depend on separate funding mechanisms and rely on distinct
resources, adding to the system´s complexity.
Previous research on India’s surveillance system suggests inconsistent, unreliable and generally
weak reporting, which was confirmed by our findings (Gaikwad et al., 2008). Our findings suggest
remaining fragmentation, unnecessary duplication of reporting efforts and avoidable inefficiencies.
A shift from staff-intensive and slow paper-based reporting towards electronic approaches could
enhance transparency, efficiency, communication and data quality. The lacking accuracy of current
data could be addressed by adequately involving reporting by private healthcare providers. Cur-
rently, only 2% and 8% of Hyderabad´s private hospitals report dengue cases to the IDSP, NVBDCP
and the GHMC respectively. Although the ratio remains small, it is essential to consider that a sub-
stantial number of private hospitals most probably do not have dengue confirmation capacities.
Thus, excluding those from the denominator would potentially improve the previously indicated
percentages. Nonetheless, that does not justify their total absence from Hyderabad’s surveillance sys-
tem, as reporting does not necessarily have to be confirmatory. Mere presumptive reporting of
potential cases would certainly be more valuable to effective dengue surveillance than the current
situation. Even if the number of integrated private facilities is to be increased; establishing continu-
ous, reliable and regular reporting is the key to success. Also, the inclusion of primary healthcare with
improved detection and reporting capacity would benefit the surveillance system.
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India’s dengue policies are often heavily autonomous and subject to little integration, which ulti-
mately leads to complex and inefficient data reporting at all administrative levels. This is clearly vis-
ible when analysing the current operation of Hyderabad’s three surveillance pillars. These mainly
operate in silos, with little or no cross-pillar interaction and coordination. Although the IDSP’s
core objective is the integration of vertical and parallel operating programmes, there is little evidence
that this objective has been achieved (Bachani, 2006; Srivastava et al., 2009). Although the district
offices are administratively merged, the IDSP’s and NVBDCP’s integration is merely limited to
reporting of laboratory-confirmed cases. Paradoxically, both pillars maintain separate reporting
streams that are only merged on state level. Finally, full integration of dengue surveillance requires
the consistent involvement of municipal activities. While the IDSP’s extensive governmental report-
ing network is potentially beneficial to municipal activities and the GHMC’s private reporting units
are highly valuable for the IDSP, cooperation remains absent. Ties between state and municipal auth-
orities are limited to emergency-driven cooperation.
Previous research suggests weak and inconsistent analysis of incoming surveillance data (Raut &
Bhola, 2014; Suresh, 2008), which is also confirmed by our findings. Experts point towards missing
technology, such as GIS spatial mapping tools, as well as insufficient data analysis during and
between endemic periods. The toolkit for national dengue burden estimation, developed by the
WHO, can be a standardised way to estimate the hidden dengue burden in Hyderabad (WHO,
2018). Dengue’s rapidly emerging nature and relatively novel occurrence in Hyderabad require a
predominantly prevention-based approach. Standardised routine processes, technical support and
cooperation with the GHMC’s dedicated GIS department constitute essential, yet missing improve-
ment opportunities. The existing network is by far not sufficient to provide comprehensive coverage
of Hyderabad’s disproportionally large population. This clearly constrains the system’s detection
capacities: calculating the ratio of all 189 listed reporting units (combining passive, active and senti-
nel) to the general population (10 Million) of Hyderabad would provide a theoretical coverage of
around 53.000 persons per reporting unit. However, this does not provide an accurate picture, as
many reporting units are not reporting at all, or only do so irregularly. Therefore, building a com-
prehensive surveillance system would require major investments in qualified staff and sufficiently
equipped surveillance units.
Several studies on India’s surveillance capacities indicate resource-related challenges, including
lacking equipment, tests and human capacities (Gupta & Reddy, 2013; Phalkey, Bhosale, et al.,
2013; Pilot et al., 2017; Pilot et al., 2019; Raut & Bhola, 2014; Srivastava et al., 2009; Suresh,
2008). Our findings confirm these resource limitations. While the IDSP faces shortages in technical
equipment, mobility, data managers and field workers, the NVBDCP is primarily challenged by field-
level human resource deficits. The availability of test-kits is sufficient for sentinel reporting units,
however, remains non-existent for surveillance workers. Contrary, being self-funded, the municipal
health wing is relatively advantaged on all resource levels. A comprehensive understanding of those
differences and structural challenges may help in establishing cooperation ties and in overcoming the
current fragmentation.
Placing our findings in the context of existing surveillance evaluation indicators reveals several
implications. A system’s sensitivity to detect an emerging outbreak is undoubtedly a key strength
and effectiveness indicator, which in Hyderabad’s context is affected by multiple of the identified
weaknesses (Drewe et al., 2012). The low accuracy and completeness of reporting, insufficient sur-
veillance resources (e.g. manpower), missing active surveillance elements, lacking private healthcare
sector involvement and missing coordination among the three surveillance pillars have an inevitably
negative impact on dengue surveillance sensitivity. In order to be able to adequately act on an emer-
ging outbreak, the timeliness of a surveillance system (the gap between outbreak start and outbreak
detection) is a further key effectiveness indicator (Drewe et al., 2012). In the case of Hyderabad, the
missing active surveillance elements in combination with inefficient and non-streamlined reporting
procedures (e.g. paper-based reporting) have a potentially negative impact on dengue surveillance
timeliness. Furthermore, missing active surveillance, as well as lacking reinforcement and
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supervision likely hinder the system’s acceptability (the compliance of stakeholders). Similarly, the
identified non-integration of the three surveillance pillars reduces the simplicity and flexibility of
the system, further impacting the effectiveness of dengue surveillance in Hyderabad (Buehler
et al., 2004; Drewe et al., 2012).
In light of the International Health Regulation’s recommendations on dengue reporting, India
would benefit from additional efforts to improve its current surveillance capacities (WHO, 2008).
To ensure a timely and reliable reporting of dengue incidence, our findings suggest an urgent
need to foster collaboration and integration across administrative boundaries and current surveil-
lance systems (Gopichandran & Subramaniam, 2020; Pilot et al., 2017).
Our findings have to be viewed in consideration of the following limitations. A large proportion of
our findings is derived from expert interviews. Expert opinions and views are not free from subjec-
tivity and distortion, especially within the highly hierarchical Indian setting. Whenever possible,
interview results were reconfirmed through triangulation. Our analysis also revealed that a clear
and concise distinction among active, passive and sentinel reporting is difficult, especially when
internal definitions and practices are incoherent and subject to frequent changes.
Conclusion and recommendations
Hyderabad’s dengue surveillance is spread across three independent and parallel operating surveil-
lance pillars. Cross-pillar cooperation, communication and integration are evident, however, limited
to specific surveillance activities and far from comprehensive. Achieving efficient cooperation and
reducing the unnecessary waste of valuable resources require continuous and dedicated efforts
from all stakeholders involved.
Existing data exchange should be shifted to a complete merge of reporting procedures, ideally
fully transferred under the IDSP’s responsibility. The potential benefits of a close cooperation
with the GHMC’s entomological and GIS department highlight the need to develop long-term
plans for continuous cooperation and mutual support. The IDSP’s main strength is reflected in its
extensive network, the NVBDCP’s asset is its surveillance and outbreak expertise, while the
GHMC is specialised in vector control and awareness. As indicated by the conceptual model of
McNabb et al., combining those strengths can ultimately result in a comprehensively integrated
and powerful surveillance approach. Therefore, collaboration across all government sectors is needed
to contribute to effective surveillance, environment management and enhanced health outcome.
Overall resources, whether governmental or municipal, should be shifted towards preventive, as
well proactive initiatives. Surveillance is not a static, isolated or independent phenomenon. Effective
surveillance is active, continuous, flexible, adaptive and interdependent. In light of the current
COVID-19 outbreak, Zika and other emerging diseases, India can ensure a healthier future by
removing boundaries and facilitating a public health surveillance that is truly comprehensive, par-
ticularly in high-burden urban areas, that require more effort and a stronger focus. Although the
Indian government has integrated the rural and urban health mission into the one health mission,
a holistic approach to fostering integrated policy making seems to be missing (D’Silva, 2013).
To improve surveillance data and ultimately our understanding of a disease, it is essential to have
continuous evaluations of public health measures in place (Franklinos et al., 2019). Adequate diag-
nostic equipment and a positive political attitude are urgently required if timely disease detection and
reduced fear of reporting are to be achieved. The strengthening of the dengue surveillance will ulti-
mately contribute to the consolidation of the surveillance and response capacities of India in the con-
text of the International Health Regulations (Franklinos et al., 2019; Suthar et al., 2018; WHO, 2005).
Finally, our study underlines the overall need for India to increase investment in public health and
health infrastructures. That requires coordinated and multi-level action targeting the development of
a competent, effective and motivated public health cadre, as well as truly integrated surveillance and
epidemic response infrastructure, for dengue and beyond.
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